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The Desegregation Opinion Revisited:
Legal or Sociological?
Morris D. Forkosch*
Professor Forkosch finds incorrect the charge which has frequently
been levelled against the Warren Court, and particularly against the
Chief Justice, that the Desegregation Case of 1954 was an improper
and unconstitutional entry into the educational and social life of the
nation. The author shows that the same decision-making process as
that employed in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson was used in the
1954 decision; therefore, he concludes that no judicial usurpation of
power has occurred.
It is the thesis of this article that the Supreme Court, regardless of
its decision for or against the state laws, had the judicial ability and
jurisdiction to render the opinion in the Desegregation Case of 1954.'
A distinction is drawn here between the judicial power to decide
a case regardless of any attendant consequences, and the reasons given
for that decision. When reasons which were supposedly valid seventy
years ago are now rejected, there is nothing illogical in this rejection
so long as the Court still adheres to the identical procedure used
earlier; but when the substance within the procedure has changed
drastically then the procedure, still the same, must reflect, as an end
result, this change. In other words, the decision may have been wrong,
the opinion's reasoning may have been fallacious and even improper
in the material it used, and the Justices may have been biased and
emotional, and yet this does not detract from their ability to decide
and opine as they did.
However, beginning with this decision, the attacks upon the
Warren Court range from the basest of personal ones upon the Chief
Justice's integrity and loyalty to the most professional and scholarly
involving his reasoning and legal ability. For example, a political
scientist has put "The Supreme Court on Trial,"2 and his jumping-off
*Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). On "decision" and "opinion"
see note 23 infra. Browi embraced four lower decisions involving Kansas, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, and Delaware, although the singular "case" is used; all were based upon
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), based upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
because, as Chief Justice Warren phrased it, "it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." Id. at 500. See,
on the later implementation of the 1954 Brown decision, the second decision in 349
U.S. 294 (1955), as well as Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which involved
and eventually resulted in the Little Rock incident discussed infra note 22.
2. C. HYNEI.mAr, THE Su Rnmm COURT ON Tnri- (1963).
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spot3 is the Desegregation Case; a professor of law has written that
beginning with this decision, "the Justices have wrought more funda-
mental changes in the political and legal structure of the United
States than during any similar span of time since the Marshall Court,"4
so that, since it does not "account directly to the electorate, [it]
should be obligated to provide adequate explanation for its actions,
lest fiat be substituted for reason;" 5 numerous law enforcement of-
ficials, including district attorneys, have pleaded for a diminution
in the "judicial takeover" in criminal law which has "tragically
weakened" their efforts and is "destroying the nation;"6 incursions into
religion, voting, apportionment, economics, and other areas have
provided the bases for charges of an unconstitutional judicial usurpa-
tion of power;? and the prestigious Conference of [State] Chief Justices
also has inveighed against federal pre-emption of state power where
Congress has not so intended.8
The Warren Court began when the Chief Justice was sworn in on
October 5, 1953; the Desegregation Case was reargued December 7-9,
1953, and then decided on May 15, 1954, so that Mr. Justice Warren
had a bare seven months' judicial background9 before writing one of
the landmark cases in this country's history.10 This Brawn opinion
sparked the Southern resistance to the decision and its progeny; it
underscores Professor Hyneman's massive indictment;" it begins what
Professor Kurland terms the "fateful decade;" 12 and it provides the
foundation for the charge by the Conference that in the field of
federal-state relations "the Supreme Court too often has tended to
3. Term used by this writer, Book Review, 9 VILL. L. REv. 364, 366 (1964).
4. Kurland, Foreword to The Supreme Court 1963 Term, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 143
(1964).
5. Kurland, The Supreme Court Today as I See It, 3 TRIAL 12, 14 (1967).
6. Quoted in Forkosch, Attacks on the Constitution, Violence, and the Necessity
for Disobedience, 35 FORD. L. REv. 71, 86 (1966).
7. E.g., C. HYNEMAN, supra note 2; see also Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119 (P. Kurland ed. 1965). The Court was, in
two early matters, writing "history essentially for political reasons, that is, in an
attempt to solve by judicial intervention some major contemporary socio-political prob-
lem upon which the case at hand could be made to bear." Id. at 126.
8. REPORT OF TIIE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS AS AFFECTED BY
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 9 (1958). See also reply to this report by Rostow, The Court and
Its Critics, 4 S. TEx. L.J. 160 (1959).
9. Earl Warren is treated sympathetically by J. WEAVER, WARREN (1967),
KATCHERn, WAERRr (1967), and L. HuSTON, PATHWAY TO JUDGMENT (1966). All go
into his life history in detail.
10. These few months of subjection to the decision-making process gave rise to
charges of inexperience, ineptitude, a desire for self-glorification and even a charge
of sinister implications concerning the Republican nomination for the presidency to
be made.
11. HYNEmAN, supra note 2.
12. Kurland, supra note 4, at 144.
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adopt the role of policy maker without proper judicial restraint. . .."13
It is questionable whether any other decisions, save Marbury14 and
Dred Scott,15 have had the political and social repercussions which
followed Brown, or whether any other decision, save Marbury,
spawned so many related determinations in other fields.' 6 It is also
doubtful that any other decision so quickly heralded the activism of
a particular Court. Whether this fountainhead 17 opinion has a con-
stitutional-legal base and is thus within the stream of adjudications
properly subject to judicial examination, reappraisal, and reversal, or
whether it represents the socio-psychological whim of nine appointed
individuals who have usurped the political, legislative and executive
functions constitutionally apportioned to the other elected branches
and have barged into a judicially untouchable area, is still an open
question in the opinion of many. If the first alternative above is
correct, as here contended, a direct challenge is made to contrary
views held by, for example, Hyneman.
That author's sophisticated approach is based upon his belief that
past judicial interpretations had limited immediate legal consequences;
13. See note 8 supra. The latest high-level general attack upon the judiciary's
activism is by Gov. Ronald Reagan (California) who feels that "[t]here is a growing
tendency among certain judges to violate traditional concepts and thus usurp the
authority of the executive and the legislative bodies." A newspaper reported that he
had suggested that some judges had substituted personal policy for legal interpreta-
tions. N. Y. TimEs, Sept. 20, 1967, at 25, col. 1.
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Concerning this doctrine
of judicial review there was much outcry by numerous people, for example, the follow-
ing year Jefferson wrote that it "would make the judiciary a despotic branch .. " 8
Woracs 310-11n (1897). Chief Justice Gibson, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
rejected the opinion because its arguments were "inconclusive," and because of "the
weakness of the position which he attempts to defend..... Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R.
330, 345 (1825), although he later retracted in Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845).
15. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was the first case holding an act of Congress unconsti-
tutional; Dred Scott was the second. This second holding was, of course, "reversed" by
the Civil War and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. On whether this latter
amendment was "constitutionally" ratified, not here discussed, See, e.g., A. AVINs,
TrE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES XV-XVi, 317-34 (1967); Lawrence, Recti-
fPing An Error of 100 Years Ago, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 30, 1967, at
99-100.
16. E.g., those given in M. Foruoscxr, CONSrITTIONAL LAW § 461 (1963).
17. See, e.g., HusToN, supra note 9, at 4, where some of these later opinions are
generalized: "The school decision was just the first of a series of constitutional inter-
pretations ...that had an explosive effect upon the educational, social, and political
life of the nation. After it came the school prayer ruling ...judgments that reversed
convictions of Communists; broader definitions of what constitutes obscenity; decisions
that frowned upon investigative and enforcement practices of police officers and upheld
constitutional rights of criminals; a few judgments that branded investigative methods of
Congressional committees as violative of the rights of individuals; and the legislative
apportionment bombshell that jolted the political structures of states to their founda-
tions."
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although the 1857 Dred Scott case' 8 had enormous political conse-
quences, the immediate legal effect "did not require any notable
alteration of political or social institutions, and it did not order the
abandonment of deeply rooted attitudes and practices of the popula-
tion." Hyneman says that the statute denounced in Dred Scott
"was intended to force highly significant social changes; the Court's
decision delayed the necessity of making those changes."
In other words, prior to 1954 the Court's judicial power was
exercised negatively, and applied to property and legal relations,
whereas now Brown "had a social consequence of a vastly different
order," calling for a rewriting of state and federal legislation relating
to public education.19 The consequence of this new judicial activism
therefore "required a basic revision of social structure and a root
change in human relationships," compelling "social relationships that
had never prevailed" in the South, so that "the nonsegregation orders
are without precedent for comprehensive and deep-cutting social con-
sequences .... 20 In effect the complaint boils down not necessarily
and solely to judicial ability and jurisdiction but to a judicial intrusion
which results in a forced upheaval of a social structure2 ' and human
relationships and which is initiated by a non-elected judiciary, in-
capable of sympathetic understanding and not responsive to the needs
of the people. 22 Thus it is basically the philosophical and jurispru-
dential approach in Brown and the consequences of the decision,
rather than the opinion itself, which make for its rejection. This
18. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
19. HYNmAN, supra note 2, at 198-99. So, too, does the author oppose other cases,
e.g., the Reapportionment Case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), discussed at
221, 269. Undoubtedly Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), would likewise
be so attacked because it affirmatively demanded that the states provide counsel for
indigents so requesting in criminal cases, and thereby make outlays in money, even
though 22 states joined in an amicus brief supporting Gideon, while only two joined
Florida in opposing him.
20. HYNEMAN, supra note 2, at 199. To an extent the judiciary itself does not
disagree, and itself revolts at the logical implications and consequences of and
attendant upon Brown and its philosophy, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964).
21. Of course the political structure is included, e.g., the one man-one vote decision
as in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), as are the economic and other structures,
e.g., note 29 infra.
22. E.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (where desegregation
of public recreational facilities was required despite allegations of possible violence);
cases cited note 1 supra, resulting in Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957),
ordering the use of federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce school de-
segregation. See, e.g., 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 931-65 (1957), and Miller & Howell,
Interposition, Nullification and the Delicate Division of Power in a Federal System, 5
J. Pui. L. 1, 18 (1956) (the attempted Southern use of doctrinal support).
23. To this writer it appears that even if the reasoning in the opinion were unas-
sailable from a legal standpoint, the opponents of the decision's consequences would
still reject everything, attack the opinion as the personal policy views of individuals,
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is so because these consequences are allegedly in the extra-legal
sphere of our national distribution of powers.
If this is an accurate statement of Hyneman's position, then, on
historical grounds, one may seriously question his view, that is that
the Supreme Court has always and necessarily determined non-legal
matters solely within a legal setting. For example, should the federal
or state governments exclusively or concurrently have power over local
and domestic commerce? This question, argue a legal historian2 and
a constitutional authority,25 was resolved by the founding fathers in
favor of the national government to the exclusion of the local, so that
judicial holdings to the contrary are incorrect; the economic and social
consequences to the nation flowing from these decisions are incalcula-
ble, yet no such violent legal and physical resistance as attended
Brown has occurred.2 Moreover, while unabated controversy con-
tinues because of the Court's decisions in the areas of religion,27
street demonstrations, anti-communist oaths, congressional investiga-
tions , and even antitrust and patent litigation,2 9 the original waves
have become ripples, whose remaining force continues to dissipate.
judicial intrusion has, even before 1789 and 1803, been an economic
and social fact in our history and it is a necessary political fact in our
constitutionally oriented form of government, since the political and
social mores of the people early disclosed an inclination toward ad-
judicating disagreements. Furthermore, since these disagreements cut
across the entirety of our domestic and international existence, their
resolution has sometimes become a judicial function subject only30 to
and continue the identical forms of resistance. In effect, therefore, it seems that the
alleged weakness of the opinion qua its reasoning is merely an excuse, not a reason,
for attacking the decision.
24. M. FAnnAND, THE FnAsING OF CONSTITUnON 45 (1913).
25. W. CROSSKEY, POTICS AND THE CONsTrrmoN LN THE HISTORY OF =T UNIED
STATFS 1, 4 (153).
26. There were, of course, vociferous objections to many of the Marshall decisions,
and invectives and defiances were common, e.g., note 14 supra. Although a somewhat
more workable accommodation has been practically effected whereby the states now
maintain a degree of coordinated control over commerce nevertheless, as this writer
has elsewhere written, the national power over the economy is today subject to little,
if any, practical limitations, whether because of the commerce clause, the war, tax or
some other power. Forkosch, Governments and Governed in the United States in
RFECUEs DE LA SocrmTE JEAN BODIN XXVI, 311-402 (1965). See also M. FoRxoscH,
CoNsnTrrnoNAL LAw § 221 (1963).
27. See, e.g., M. Fo~xoscmr, CONSTnTuTONAL LAw § 399 (1963), and especially
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
30. Of course a valid statute may be so judicially interpreted that the legislature
rejects and amends it, requiring the court to accept the statute's new approach. See,
e.g., Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 119 Kan. 47, 237 P. 1037
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the amending power.31 The national will has demonstrated time and
again a devotion to judicial independence in these areas.32 One may
also point to the fact that a lapse of time does not make for decisional,
legal, economic or political stability,33 so that when religious, social,
and like areas of conduct are so affected there seems to be no valid
reason, save emotion, to lay a shadow. Regardless, the question
whether Brown was "properly" and "correctly" decided still remains.3
Brown rejected Plessy v. Ferguson,5 but two aspects are necessarily
involved and require analysis: the Court's statement in Brown was
that "any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected;"6 yet the holding on the exact facts in Plessy had long
before been outmoded. This means that the rejection of Plessy is not
necessarily because of its facts but because of its reasoning, and that
the superficial 'law" established by Plessy was not being followed.
These two aspects must be examined separately for a proper under-
standing of exactly what Brown did in order to determine whether
the Chief Justice is guilty in this case of the charges levelled against
him.
Before Plessy came to the Supreme Court in 1896, the concept of
"equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and colored races"
in land or water transportation had been judicially settled in several
decisions. Plessy merely confirmed prior views and holdings to the
effect that the states were free to provide as they pleased, that is, to
require or to reject segregation in transportation, so long as interstate
commerce was not directly burdened. For example, the reconstructed
Louisiana Constitution provided that "all persons shall enjoy equal
rights and privileges upon any conveyance of a public character," and
by an 1869 statute designed to effectuate this provision common
(1925), an even more egregious illustration, where a state supreme court repudiated the
federal Supreme Court's interpretation of a state statute.
31. See Forkoseh, The Alternative Amending Clause in Article V: Reflections and
Suggestions, 51 MnmN. L. REv. 1053 (1967). Reversals, that is, internal self-corrections,
are of course available to the Court.
32. E.g., the failure of the Roosevelt court-packing bill in 1937, on which see BAbXon,
BACK TO BACK (1967), a popular, if not satisfactory, account of the effort.
33. E.g., United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944),
reversing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), making history
in legal and other federal-state relations. In the economic field see also Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 294
U.S. 240 (1935), and related cases and discussions in M. Fonnoscir, CONSTrITrTONAL
LAW §§ 208-42, 291-99 & passim (1963). On the political side see Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964). Of course there may be exceptions, e.g., Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
34. There are many discussions and analyses of the Desegregation Case, too numerous
to cite, but none of which approaches the opinion in all details as is done here.
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). See also note 57 infra.
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carriers were permitted to refuse admission to their railroad cars to any
person who refused to pay the fare, who was of infamous character, or
who was disorderly, "[p]rovided, said [carrier] rules and regulations
make no discrimination on account of race or color . . . ."7 This
constitutional and legislative effort to eliminate discrimination based
upon color was successfully attacked in 1878 as a burden upon inter-
state commerce. 38 However, the decision was confined "to the statute
in its effect upon foreign and interstate commerce, expressing no
opinion as to its validity in any other respect."3 9 There was one
concurring Justice, however, whose twenty-six page opinion may be
contrasted with the four page opinion of the majority, and who
devoted two of these twenty-six pages to a slight discussion of "ques-
tions of a kindred character [which] have arisen in several of the
States, which support these [commerce oriented] views in a course
of reasoning entirely satisfactory and conclusive."40 This reference
was to six cases decided in five states which, based upon the rea-
sonableness of the classification, upheld separate schools for white
and colored children.41 The concurring Justice said of one such holding
that "former statutes of the State invested the directors [of the schools]
with such discretion to admit, and it is impliedly conceded that it
would be competent for the legislature again to confer that author-
ity."42 In effect what he did was to rush into the general area de-
liberately left open by the majority, and say that intrastate commerce
37. The statute is set forth in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 486 (1878).
38. In Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), a steamboat licensed by the United
States transported freight and passengers along the Mississippi River, between New
Orleans and Vicksburg, Miss., touching at intermediary landings within and without
Louisiana as occasion required. Josephine DeCuir embarked at New Orleans for such an
intermediary point at Hermitage, La., but was refused space in the "white" cabins
solely because of color. She sued the master and owner of the vessel for damages for
her mental and physical suffering. The defense was that the statute was void because-
of the commerce clause. This defense was finally upheld, when the Supreme Court
immediately rejected any construction or application of the statute "as a regulation of
internal commerce, or as affecting anything else than commerce among the States."
95 U.S. at 487. The statute was denounced because ten different states might all have-
different internal requirements with which a master would otherwise successively have-
to comply; this would slow down, burden, and otherwise interfere with the trip-
that is, commerce. 95 U.S. at 489.
39. 95 U.S. at 490-91.
40. 95 U.S. at 504, per Mr. Justice Clifford.
41. That is, "where both classes of children . . . enjoy substantially equa
advantages in different schools, and the separate school for colored children is clearly-
authorized by the statute, the only doubt that arises is as to the constitutional validity-
of the law which authorizes such separation [solely] on the basis of color: and that
is the real question in this case." State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 207
(1871), cited and digested by Mr. Justice Clifford in Hall, 95 U.S. at 504. See also
Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Wood's Rep. 177 (5th Cir. 1878), upholding
similar Louisiana conduct and citing Mr. Justice Clifford's views.
42. 95 U.S. at 505, citing Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
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is within a state's competence and it could require or reject carrier
segregation by analogy to education and the judicial views thereon.
Although pure dictum, this suggestion was nevertheless followed in a
lower federal court for Louisiana itself.43
Regardless of its chagrin at finding the commerce aspect determina-
tive of the constitutionality of the 1869 statute, in 1873 that state
enacted a civil rights law declaring that every Louisiana and federal
citizen residing there "shall have and enjoy equal and impartial
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges from all common
carriers on land or water, from inn-keepers and from all public
places of resort licensed by the State or by any municipal corpora-
tion."4 However, by 1890 reconstruction had long since ended, and
a new Louisiana statute required all railway companies and their
officials to "provide equal but separate accommodations for the white,
and colored races . . ... 4 The state's highest court held this to be
"confined in its application to passengers traveling exclusively within
the borders of the State,"46 so that when Plessy came to a head the
question of state jurisdiction to require or to reject segregation was,
in effect, already settled; the only question was whether interstate
commerce was burdened or involved. Mr. justice Brown wrote for
the Plessy majority that "[i]n the present case no question of inter-
ference with interstate commerce can possibly arise, since the East
Louisiana Railway appears to have been purely a local line, with both
of its termini within the State of Louisiana .... -47
The facts disclosed that Plessy paid for and took possession of a
first-class seat, despite the conductor's request that he go to a "colored"
coach. A police officer assisted in ejecting Plessy, who was thereafter
prosecuted for violating the law. The state's Supreme Court upheld
the statute's constitutionality as against fourteenth amendment claims
saying, inter alia, that if the act were "applicable to interstate pas-
sengers . . . it would be unconstitutional, because in violation of the
exclusive right vested in Congress to regulate commerce between the
states ... ."48 The Supreme Court agreed with this statement of the
43. Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Wood's Rep. 177 (5th Cir. 1878).
44. Act 84, L. 1873, § 1, in La. Rev. Laws 96 (1897). The other provisions gave the
offended citizen a right to damages, and made violators guilty of a misdemeanor.
45. La. Rev. Laws 762 (1897).
46. State ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 774, 11 So. 74, 75 (1892), quoting
at length from and following the lead of Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi,
133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890).
47. 163 U.S. at 548.
.48. Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 11 So. 948 (1893). The court cited its own
prior holding to that effect but held "no such application of the statute" was involved
as "it appears on the face of the information that relator was proceeded against as
'a passenger traveling wholly within the limits of the state of Louisiana on a passenger
train belonging to the East Louisiana Railroad Company carrying passengers in their
[ VOL,. 21
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law, citing its own 1878 Hall holding to that effect.49 Of the Justices
sitting in Plessy only Justices Harlan and Field sat on the 1878 bench;
thus in the earlier case all the Justices based their determination upon
commerce, with the lone concurrence using an educational analogy
merely to bolster his own commerce reasoning. In Plessy, of the eight
Justices participating,50 seven (including Mr. Justice Field) did what
the earlier concurrer had done, namely, used burden on interstate
commerce as the determining factor with the educational analogy
coming in to support their views in repelling a fourteenth amendment
attack. There was, however, one difference-in 1878 the educational
analogy had been used to show that the states had complete power
over their internal affairs, whereas now the separate fourteenth
amendment argument was itself required to be met, on its own
grounds,51 that is, that the amendment "prohibits certain restrictive
legislation on the part of the States."5 2 The two Hall opinions never
touched upon this new constitutional argument, 53 and so the 1868
amendment was never before technically considered as applied to
state segregation of carrier transportation.54
In effect, therefore, the activities of the Louisiana railway involved
in Plessy were held to be intrastate commerce, not impinging upon the
federal commerce powers. This possibility brought the Court to
the only other question in the case, namely, the interpretation and
application of the new fourteenth amendment. If Plessy were to
have arisen in 1954, the commerce clause would have been determina-
tive, and the unquestioned burden upon interstate commerce, however
slight, would have been found sufficient to warrant condemnation.
coaches within the state of Louisiana.' It thus appears that the [commerce clause],
is not involved." Id. at 82-83, 11 So. at 949.
49. While not particularly mentioning prior cases bearing on these views, it had:
earlier held in a railroad-segregation case that the state's judicial interpretation limiting:
the statute to intrastate commerce was binding on the Supreme Court and therefore the.
statute, not burdening interstate commerce, would otherwise be upheld. Louisville,.
N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890). Mr. Justice Harlan dissented (as.
did Mr. Justice Bradley) in feeling that Hall was determinative, even though requiring:
nonsegregation. See 133 U.S. at 594. Mr. Justice Harlan also said he would not consider
"other grounds upon which ... the Statute ... might properly be held to be repugnant
to the Constitution .. " 133 U.S. at 594-95.
50. Mr. Justice Brewer did not participate in the decision. 163 U.S. at 552.
51. A thirteenth amendment contention was given short shrift. 163 U.S. at 542-43.
52. 163 U.S. at 542. On federal affirmative, and not merely corrective, power, see
notes 54 & 91 infra.
53. Although the majority's final expression that it was "expressing no opinion as to
[the statute's] validity in any other respect," mentioned previously as referring to any
interstate commerce burden, may also be interpreted as referring to the new amendment.
95 U.S. at 490-91.
54. Of course Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), had held that the amendment's prohibitions reached only state action and the
grant of enforcement powers to Congress was for corrective, not direct, legislation
.See 163 U.S. at 546-47. See also note 91 infra.
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The proof of this view is not difficult in the light of what the
Supreme Court said long before and since Brown,5 so that on its
facts, and with relation solely to commerce, the 1896 holding had been
overruled prior to 1954! Plessy, therefore, as a holding, had no com-
merce significance and could not be of any importance in this field
six decades later; it is only because the fourteenth amendment had
never been so raised that the 1896 Court was confronted by the
meaning and application of the new and separate constitutional
language to a state's law requiring such local conduct by a carrier.
Plessy's answer, later extended broadly in other areas of conduct and
therefore significant in Brown, was twofold. First there was an
examination of the background of the new amendment, and then
there was a rejection of the discrimination contention. 6 Plessy's open-
ing paragraph lumps these two aspects together:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or
to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling
of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and
even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race
to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police
power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establish-
ment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been
held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States
where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most
earnestly enforced.
57
This paragraph is obviously a conclusory one, and the opinion bears
the burden of supporting it. The first analogical reference"8 is to
55. Most of these opinions, with excerpts, may be found in M. ForuKoseu, CoNs'nru-
T oNAL LAw 199-241 (1963), and see especially the dissent by Mr. Justice McReynolds
in NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 609-10 (1939), as well as Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), and United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948), and, more
recently, Mr. Justice Black's concurrence in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
56. In effect, this bears upon the italicized "statement" aspect of the dichotomy
earlier suggested for examination, for here the subjective contention is involved. In
other words the Brown holding on its facts and its statement rejecting Plessy has been
distinguished. See notes 35-36 supra & accompanying text. Shortly, it will be shown
that by 1954 the Plessy holding as law had long since been overturned; yet the Plessy
language still remained, even though obiter, and it is this language which is being
analyzed now. This Plessy language occurred because of the fourteenth amendment
argument raised in such a factual context and for the first time. In Plessy this argu-
ment is met by the two-fold method discussed in the text, and of this new dichotomy
it is the subjective aspect which relates to the Brown statement rejecting Plessy.
57. 163 U.S. at 544.
58. If this educational reference is merely to support the transportation holding, then
Chief justice Warrens statement terming it "the so-called 'separate but equal' doctrine
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eight local cases on educational separation;5 9 Mr. Chief Justice Shaw's
1849 Massachusetts opinion is given major recognition through
quotation,60 while the other state courts are only cited, and "[s]imilar
laws have been enacted by Congress under its general power of
legislation over the District of Columbia... "61 The second analogical
reference is to "[flaws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races,"
with only one state case cited. Next, continued the Plessy Court,
"[t]he distinction between laws interfering with the political equality
of the Negro and those requiring the separation of the two races in
schools, theatres and [intrastate] railway carriages has been frequently
drawn by this court," for example, a political discrimination prevent-
ing a Negro from sitting upon a jury "was a discrimination which
implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security
of the right of the colored race, and was a step toward reducing them
to a condition of servility ... "62
At this point Plessy illustrates the political, theatre and railway
announced by this Court in Plessy . . ." is technically incorrect, although permissible
because of its subsequent judicial use. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488
(1954).
59. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
60. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849), where the language
so quoted speaks of "civil and political powers," and of the "rights of all, as they are
settled and regulated by law .... " 163 U.S. at 544. In the state opinion, however,"colored persons . . . are entitled by law, in this commonwealth, to equal rights,
constitutional and political, civil and social," although "[llegal rights must, after all,
depend upon the provisions of law; certainly all those rights of individuals which can
be asserted and maintained in any judicial tribunal." 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 206. "We
must then resort to the law, to ascertain what are the rights of individuals, in regard to
the schools." 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 207. Chief Justice Shaw, it is suggested, confuses
the concepts involved, for today's rights are discussed and understood in separate
terms, e.g., political as distinguished from civil. Thus a particular right may or may
not be one explicitly set forth in the Constitution; it may be a penumbral one, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and yet be entitled to that document's
protection. Another right may be explicitly set forth in a state's statute which creates,
grants, or recognizes it where it is not so constitutionally protected. Such a statutory
right depends upon the law's provisions, e.g., workmen's compensation. Other
statutorily expressed state rights may repeat the federal Constitution and thus be doubly
protected (if that is necessary). In effect Shaw's views were conditioned not only by
his times but also by the absence of any fourteenth amendment limitations upon the
powers of a state. His opinion nowhere mentions or cites any statute but the one
there involved, and it does not refer to any case or opinion in any jurisdiction to
support his reasoning. The Chief Justice therefore utilized a tabula rasa to express his
personal views (and those accepted by his four brethren), and the Plessy opinion
utilizes these for its justification.
61. 163 U.S. at 545, with only the statutory citation given. Congress had, prior to
1874, left to the locally elected officials the handling of this educational aspect, but in
that year substituted a presidentially appointed three-man board, and since 1906 had
required the federal district court judges there to appoint the members; in 1967, the
House approved a bill to return this power to the locality and it should, as of this
writing, be enacted.
62. 163 U.S. at 545. See also note 92 infra.
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distinction by discussing the Civil Rights Cases63 to show that the
fourteenth amendment did not apply to private amusements, and
then discussing the rail cases and their inter-intra distinction already
analyzed.6 For the purpose of defending its views on the fourteenth
amendment the Plessy opinion need not have referred to these railway
cases on the basis of commerce; therefore, the only purpose must have
been to show that color was not a bar to state segregation where
no political right was involved, and, additionally, that any non-political
separation of the whites and blacks did not result in a violation of
any kind of legally-protected right per se.65
It is this second aspect which is the nub of the Brown rejection.
In Plessy the plaintiff's suit was for writs of prohibition and common-
law certiorari against a judge of the state's criminal court in order
to prevent that court from proceeding further with a prosecution
under the state's carrier-segregation requirements. 66 The constitu-
tionality of the law was attacked, however, on grounds of the four-
teenth amendments privileges and immunities, due process, and equal
protection clauses. The application of the first such clause was re-
jected, as disclosed by the foregoing analysis; the due process and
equal protection arguments were somewhat interchangeably discussed,
with overlapping language used, but the two clauses may be dis-
cussed separately.67 Thus due process was raised by the contention
that "in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the
dominant [here white] race ... is property, in the same sense that a
right of action, or of inheritance, is property."68 This substantive due
63. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
64. Some cases other than those cited above are referred to and discussed, but these
do not add to the analysis. The Plessy opinion, after so mentioning these cases, says:
"A like course of reasoning applies to the case under consideration, since the Supreme
Court of Louisiana . . . held that the statute in question did not apply to interstate
passengers, but was confined in its application to passengers travelling exclusively
within the borders of the State." 163 U.S. at 54.
65. The Court, however, offered a sop to the plaintiff by writing that "we are not
prepared to say that the conductor, in assigning passengers to the coaches according to
their race, does not act at his peril, or that the provision of the second section of the
act, that denies to the passenger compensation in damages for a refusal to receive him
into a coach in which he properly belongs, is a valid exercise of the legislative power.
Indeed, we understand it to be conceded by the state's attorney, that such part of the
act as exempts from liability the railway company and its officers is unconstitutional.
The power to assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine
to which race the passenger belongs, as well as the power to determine who, under
the laws of the particular State, is to be deemed a white, and who a colored person.
This question, though indicated in the brief of the plaintiff in error, does not properly
arise in the record in this case...." 163 U.S. at 548-49.
66. See also note 65 supra.
67. For a discussion of equal protection see notes 87-90 infra & accompanying text.
68. 163 U.S. at 549 (emphasis in original).
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process claim was rejected 69 by a tour de force, the Court saying that
if a white man were assigned to a colored coach so that his reputation
were thereby damaged he could justifiably sue on the above premise,
but if he were a colored man and were so assigned, how could there
be damage to non-existent property "since he is not lawfully entitled
to the reputation of being a white man."70 This conclusion was not
bolstered by any citation, but was raised to answer an argument then
advanced which involved a reductio ad absurdum: that if states were
so permitted to separate the two races in carriers, then the same con-
clusion would support such a separation of whites whose hair was
differently colored, or who were aliens, or who were of different
nationalities; or, even further, to require whites to paint their homes
white, blacks black, require "their vehicles or business signs to be of
different colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good
as the other, or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one
of another color." 1 In reply the Court pointed with pride to its earlier
judicial holdings to the contrary, the three reasons given for the
decisions being that the statutes were there unreasonable, enacted in
bad faith, and oppressive to a particular class. 2 To determine here
whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . . .there must
69. The rejection language may variously be termed subjective, emotional, biased,
a product of the dominant mores, conditioned by one's upbringing-in short, the
predilections of humans who, because of their position, are final in the judicial sphere
and its related areas. While this may be a somewhat heady use of terms, the reason,
if not the justification, is to drive home the point being made by this writer, namely,
that here, as well as later in the equal protection discussion, the Court was using sub-
jective evaluations to determine the factual situation. A counter to this approach is that
it impliedly, if not expressly, discloses antipathy to the Court's use of a personal equation
in solving problems, and that this is exactly what the Warren Court is doing today;
thus, to be logically consistent, this writer must now criticize most of the current
decisions. The answer is that, regardless of one's overall views concerning this aspect,
that is, whether or not the Court should so formulate decisions, the actual use of such
a method in 1896 provides a justification for similar use in deciding an analogous
factual problem in 1954.
70. 163 U.S. at 549. Here the Court seems to assume, if not imply, that a "white"
man per se has a certain reputation which is or can be termed property, and that no
colored person could possess this particular property. This is highly questionable on
strict logical analysis but, for this article, the point is made that such a statement by the
Court involves subjective evaluations and reasoning.
71. 163 U.S. at 549-50.
72. "The reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be [1]
reasonable, and [2] extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the
promotion of the public good, and [3] not for the annoyance or oppression of a
particular class." 163 U.S. at 550. The Court discussed Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), where a municipal license was required of laundries operated in other
than brick or stone buildings, but the application of this classification was denounced
because "directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons" and resulting in
"so unequal and oppressive" a result "as to amount to a practical denial . .-. [of]
equal protection." 118 U.S. at 373. The Court also referred to analogous judicial de-
terminations of state views.
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necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determin-
ing the [due process] question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act [1]
with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the
people, and [2] with a view to [a] the promotion of their comfort, and
[b] the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this
standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the
separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitu-
tionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the correspond-
ing acts of state legislatures. 3
What the Court did in this quotation was to set up its own standard
and to uphold the law under this standard. Then the Court men-
tioned the analogous federal law in education to show that federally
such usages, customs, and traditions were to be found, and that the
Louisiana statute could not be more obnoxious under the due process
clause in the fourteenth amendment than federal statutes could be
under the fifth.7 4 In the same breath, the Court flagellated the
attorneys for the petitioner by asking pointedly why these federal
and state laws had not "been questioned," that is, because such laws
were admittedly constitutional. Even if this entire reasoning qua
justification is accepted, then why the mention of peace and order as a
goal, unless the Court feared that the South's resistance to a different
decision might result in another Dred Scott-Civil War situation, or
in a threat to peace and order,75 or at the least felt that the "promotion
of [the people's] comfort" was required. Just who these "people" were
and are, insofar as the Court refers to their "established usages,
customs and traditions .. . [and] comfort. . . ." is a political and
social mystery;76 obviously the "people" did not include the blacks,
as they had no self-established usages concerning this separation; the
"people" probably did not embrace the lowest economic and social
classes in the North and West, to whom the struggle for existence
was sufficiently grim not to have them shoulder another cross; and
there were also neo-abolitionists and others who likewise refused
to embrace such a philosophy.7 7 By "people," the majority now
created its own reflected image and, in effect, imagined the absolutely
necessary consequences which, in a latter-day setting, ultimately if
not immediately proved to be false. Thus the "reasonableness" of
the Louisiana statute was not so easily and simply to be determined,
73. 163 U.S. at 550-51.
74. Of course as to the District of Columbia the relationship of Congress is to be
analogized to that of a state legislature. See M. Fonxoscn, CONsTrruTnONAL LAw §
71 (1963).
75. See also quotation accompanying note 89 infra.
76. See Forkosch, Who Are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitution, 19
W. lies. L. REv. - (1967),
77. For example, see Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessj. 163 U.S. at 552.
[ VeOL. 21
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
was not so cavalierly to be measured by such a subjectively created
standard, and was not to be backed into by casting aspersions upon
the attorneys.
However, the Court concluded, "the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff's argument" is "the assumption that the enforced separation
of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority."
78
The Court appears to be distinguishing between different kinds of
rights, and assumes legislation is impotent to alleviate discrimination.
Finally, the Court abnegates its affirmative judicial powers and func-
tions although in reaching its decision, the Court has already nega-
tively exercised them.
The superficial rights distinguished were those of a legal and a social
nature, that is, "the civil and political rights of both races" as con-
trasted with a right to a social commingling. The governments, state
and federal, said the Court, cannot do more than secure the legal
rights of persons,7 9 and when these are equal then "one cannot be
inferior to the other civilly or politically." 0 Turning then to the social
aspect, "the argument . . . assumes that social prejudices may be
overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to
the Negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We
cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet
upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural
affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary
consent of individuals."8' This straw-man argument misses the point;
the eradication of active discrimination in political, economic, and
like non-social areas may be distinguished from the social type of
discrimination, and where the former may properly and successfully
be the subject of legislation, the latter may be ignored.82 However,
78. 163 U.S. at 551.
79. Quoting from and adopting language in People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448
(1883), that "the end for which [government] is organized" is to secure "to each of its
citizens equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for improvement and
progress," and therefore in attempting to do more the implication must be that this
would be unconstitutional. 163 U.S. at 551.
80. 163 U.S. at 551-52. The dissenting views of Mr. Justice Harlan, discussed below,
did not disagree with the majority's distinction between political and social, see 163
U.S. at 554-66, nor with the holding on jury rights in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880). The conclusion as to non-inferiority, however, was not acceptable,
to Mr. Justice Harlan: "[tlhe arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race,
while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with
the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution. It
cannot be justified upon any legal grounds." 163 U.S. at 562.
81. 163 U.S. at 551. In Plessy Mr. Justice Harlan did not disagree with these expres-
sions. His dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), contained express
agreement "that government has nothing to do with social, as distinguished from
technically legal, rights of individuals. No government ever has brought, or ever can
bring, its people into social intercourse against their wishes." 109 U.S. at 59.
82. These were the arguments used in the 1940s against anti-discrimination laws;
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Mr. Plessy was not contending that equal rights are an incident and
function of an enforced commingling of blacks and whites. In short,
the Court's standard and its instant discussion both make incorrect
assumptions which flow from subjective views or beliefs.
Although incapable of precise reference, the views and beliefs of
these seven Justices seem to stem from the historic background given
by Mr. Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case. 4 There, speaking of the
conditions and mores prevailing in the United States and England in
the final quarter of the Eighteenth Century, he wrote that the Negro
slaves "had for more than a century before been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect ...
It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which
no one thought of disputing... and men in every grade and position
in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits,
as well as in matters of public concern .... The legislation of the dif-
ferent Colonies furnishes positive and indisputable proof of this fact."8
When Plessy was decided Dred Scott was but fifty years old, and every
sitting justice had lived through it and its aftermath; on the Plessy
bench was also Mr. Justice Field, who had served with Justices
Taney, Wayne, Catron, Nelson, and Grier, all of whom had supported
the Dred Scott holding and had also given separate views. The two
amazing aspects of the Plessy opinions were that the sole dissent was
by a Kentuckian, and that the other six who, by their silence accepted
Justice Brown's language and views, had not changed an iota from
their early attitudes. Mr. Justice Taney had mentioned "the legislation
of the States" as showing that "at the time the Constitution was
the reply was along the lines given here. There may or may not be validity in the
claim that social discrimination will eventually be affected by the other and be softened,
if not eliminated; but this result is not important legally for the question of legislative
power.
83. The opinion's final sentence in this paragraph follows along the same vein and is
therefore somewhat puzzling: "If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitu-
tion of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane." 163 U.S. at 552.
Mr. Justice Harlan's response was, in effect, to declare that one's civil rights (which
the majority was willing to enforce) embraced one's constitutional "equality" under
the fourteenth amendment, see note 80 supra; if so embraced, the Plessy majority was
clearly wrong in its conclusion, so that this head-on disagreement had to be resolved.
Later courts sought to do this by creating exceptions, but with Brown the answer was
clear-cut. The repercussions of Brown thereafter resulted directly in the overruling of
Plessy in a public transportation case, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff'g
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
84. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407-12.
85. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407-08. It may be remarked that Mr. Justice Taney's
conjunction of "social or political relations" with "no rights," if followed logically as a
conceded major premise, allows the Plessy majority to argue that the Civil War amend-
ments removed only the political and not the social relations from discriminatory state
action.
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adopted, and long afterwards," "the inferior and subject condition of
the" Negro, that any change in a "portion of the Union... had not
been produced by any change of opinion in relation to this race; but
because it was discovered, from experience, that slave labor was un-
suited to the climate and productions" there, and that such "legislation
and histories" show that the slaves were not "then" acknowledged as
having status and rights.86 The entire tenor of Mr. Justice Taney's
opinion was, in effect, to suggest that change8 7 would not be judicially
obnoxious and to suggest that the entire thrust of the Civil War, its
resulting three amendments and the Reconstruction Period was to
make for change. However, according to the Plessy majority, the
change occurred only in a narrow and legalistic fashion which limited
it to civil and political rights; they refused to admit that any social
change was possible or should have occurred. The smugness of this
attitude is underscored by the use of pre-Civil War citations without
recognizing the intervening decades and the impact of change upon
these earlier attitudes and usages. This is best illustrated by the
Court's answer to the argument that inferiority may be assumed from
the forced separation; namely, that if, as has been more than once
the case, and is not unlikely to be so again,88 "the colored race should
become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should
enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the
white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race,
at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption."8 This total non
sequitur begins with an irrelevant fear psychosis, makes unwarranted
assumptions, and now simply draws a conclusion which is itself
suspect.90
86. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416, 412, 407 (emphasis added). It may be noted that
such "inferior and subject condition" existed into the Civil War itself, and into the period
during which the fourteenth amendment was being framed and presented to the
states. See AviNs, supra note 15, at 23-298, giving debates in Congress during
1860-68 with congressional awareness of existing national, not only Southern, dis-
crimination, including that in the District of Columbia, concerning schools, continued
slavery, inability to testify as witnesses in the federal courts, riding or seating in street-
cars and transportation, and voting. Thus no doubt can be had as to the pre-fourteenth
amendment existence of such conditions but, it is suggested, this supports the views
of Mr. Justice Harlan in 1883 and 1896 that the Negro was supposed to have, been freed
of these impediments because the amendment was drafted with these discriminations
before the Congress. See note 110 infra.
87. Referring, of course, to the Reconstruction Period and the carpetbaggers, on which
see, e.g., J. RANDALL, THE Crvm WAR AND RECONS'UMCON (1937); W. DUNNING,
EssAYs ON TM CrvI. WAR AND REcONSmRUCTION 176-252 (1931); J. PI=n, Tim
PROSTRATE SoUTH: SOUTH CAROmIA UNDER NEGRO GovERm=r (1874).
88. Thus the current "white backlash" and the activities of Black Power advocates
seem to have judicial antecedents. See generally Forkosch, supra note 6.
89. 163 U.S. at 551.
90. See also note 70 supra, where the Court feels that a white person assigned to a
colored coach could sue for damages to his reputation, but a black person so assigned
could not thereby be damaged.
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The substantive due process arguments in Plessy included and
covered the equal protection aspect; nevertheless, these clauses are
being treated separately. The Plessy majority throughout used "dis-
tinction" while Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent used "separation."91 This
language requires a degree of clarification for present understanding,
but from it will also emerge the basic fallacy upon which the critics
of Brown build. Apparently all Justices in Plessy understood that
"equal protection and security should be given to all under like cir-
cumstances."92 Put differently, if a community of ten thousand persons
were all alike, that is, in like circumstances for a law's purposes and
effectuation, then treating one differently would run afoul of the
concepts embodied in equal protection. However, if A were properly
carved out of this ten thousand, leaving the balance as B, then each
group qua group could be treated differently, but within each group
all persons would have to be treated equally. The question whether
this carving, distinction, or classification is a proper one has to be
determined first, for if invalid for any reason the A/B line is rejected
and the total group has to be treated as all A or all B, not as two
groups, otherwise all in like circumstances would not be getting equal
protection and security. The drawing of such a classification line
separating persons is a legislative function 93 but whether or not this
classification or scheme itself has a sufficiently legal and constitutional
basis becomes a judicial question.
91. See, e.g., "a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races," and "in
the nature of things it [the fourteenth amendment] could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color," and "distinctions based upon physical differences."
163 U.S. at 543, 544 & 551 respectively. The dissent notes the "arbitrary separation
... on the basis of race... ." 163 U.S. at 562.
92. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), where a black
was convicted of murder by an all-white jury, the Court said that the amendment did
not prevent discriminations: the state "may confine the selection [of jurors] to males,
to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational
qualifications. . . . Its [the amendment's] aim was against discrimination because of
race or color . . . and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against" the
"emancipated race." It therefore concluded that such jury discrimination "because of
their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored
man. ... 100 U.S. at 310. See also notes 80 supra & 110 infra. If there had been
any confusion in Plessy as to classification or like circumstances, these Justices-
Harlan and Field-could have been depended upon to speak up. Their silence assures
that the conclusions here given are warranted.
93. In Plessy, for example, the majority's concluding paragraph opened: "It is true
that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a colored
person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a difference
of opinion in the different States .... But these are questions to be determined under
the laws of each State .... ." 163 U.S. at 552. And with respect to "whether the
statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation," the majority said that as "to this
there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature." 163 U.S. at
550.
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The legislature therefore proposes the classification, and the judici-
aly examines it; if bad, the legislature may try again with another
proposed classification; if and when good, the judiciary then separately
and additionally examines the impact or method of effectuating the
legislation upon the persons in the class or group so affected to
determine on grounds other than the classification itself whether the
state has independent power so to act.9 If the state does not have this
power to act, and regardless of the validity of the classification, then a
constitutional amendment may be required to enable it to act. If the
state has this power to act, then the judiciary finally examines to see if
all within the classified group receive equal protection. Only at the
very end of such an analysis will "equal protection and security" be
required to "be given to all under like circumstances."95 To illustrate
these concepts is not difficult, for the same Plessy bench, eight months
later, unanimously96 announced that "it is not within the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment to withhold from States the power of classi-
fication, . . . [but] such classification cannot be made arbitrarily."9
They concluded that:
It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve
a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and that in all cases it must appear not only that a classification has been
made, but also that it is one based upon some reasonable ground-some
difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classifica-
tion-and is not a mere arbitrary selection.98
94. See, e.g., note 65 supra, for the Plessy suggestion there termed a "sop." These
and other grounds there referred to are based on due process, but the commerce clause
may enter, as heretofore disclosed in the Plessy analysis, and as said in Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915), "It must also be said that reasonable classification implies action
consistent with the legitimate interests of the State, and it will not be disputed that
these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility to exclusive Federal
power. The authority to control immigration . . . is vested solely in the Federal
Government... ." 239 U.S. at 42.
95. This series of steps need not be undertaken in this order, for a decision may
reject a law or its application and the opinion discuss only one, or commingle many;
the task of clarifying may rest with the lawyer.
96. Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). The decision was 6-3; the
dissent did not object to what here follows, but only to the application of these principles
because a "creature of statute" was involved, and the constitutionality of such a statute
"appears to have been upheld by the courts of most of the States in which it has been
chalenged." 165 U.S. at 167.
97. 165 U.S. at 155. Compare Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), sustaining a
racial anti-cohabitation law, which was based upon a "narrow view of the Equal
Protection Clause [which] was soon swept away" by the Ellis opinion, 165 U.S. 150
(1897).
98..165 U.S. 165-66. Note the "reasonable ground" basis, and the "just and proper"
and "arbitrary" language, all relating to due process concepts, as well as to state
police powers. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Chief Justice Warren wrote
that in dealing with "distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely
asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred
to the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the [miscegenation] case at bar, however, we
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Or, to use an opinion written ten years before Plessy, a statute is
unconstitutional when "it divides the owners or occupiers [of a
building] into two classes, not having respect to their personal char-
acter and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature
and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary
line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to pursue
their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and
on the other those from whom that consent is withheld at their mere
will and pleasure." 9 If the Plessy opinions had used any of the quoted
language, adapted to their own facts, then the term "classification"
could now be used unambiguously and meaningfully. While neither
opinion used or discussed this term as such, the concept was there as
an unexpressed major premise and, as here involved, necessitates that
a valid classification be first created, which itself must separately be
upheld as reasonable, have some relation to its object and purpose,
and otherwise be within the power of the state.100 The legislative
drawing of such a classification may stem from and be based upon
many factors, may involve a high degree of selectivity, choice, and
discretion, and may run counter to the views of many persons, even
those of the Supreme Court itself; but the question involves not
the actual classification but the ability to choose that classification.
To exercise this ability the legislature must have proper facts before it
and must proceed in a proper manner. These facts may include
many items, and a people's "established usages, customs, and tradi-
tions" are as much an institutional fact as the physical buildings in
which the educational process takes place. In ordinary consideration
these "man made" facts are, however, intangibles, whereas a building,
for example, is a tangible. Equality in the latter, required by the
statute involved in Plessy, was necessary before a color classification
in intangibles would be permitted. Color classification might also be
said to have been a man-made statutory tangible, but the drawing of
this line was judicially permitted because of the intangibles behind it.
Thus the "established usages," into 1896, were held still to be an
institutional-social fact entering the judicial examination of the legis-
lative classification.1 1
deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application
does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to
race." 388 U.S. at 9.
99. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
100. See, e.g., M. FonRoscH, CONsTrrTUnONAL LAw 444-53, 468-78 (1963). In areas
other than color, see, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252-55 (1946) (a tax case);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (a poll tax case).
101. On whether these man-made institutions are social facts for purposes of entering
into this judicial process, see R. MAcIvER, Socmry-ITs STUmCTURE AND CHANcES
14-17 (1933); Fuller, Americean Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 452 (1934);
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These tangible and intangible factors may nevertheless be insuf-
ficient to support a particular color classification and may therefore be
held to violate due process; generally it is this due process attack
which constitutes the main argument against a classifying law or its
enforcement. Ordinarily if a valid classification is found, there is
not much support for a claim that within a class so separated or dis-
tinguished the law is not being applied equally. In other words the"pure" equal protection argument vanishes.10 2 In Plessy, however, the
major question (after disposing of the commerce argument) involved
classification. Was the separation of these persons on the basis of
color a constitutionally valid one? For purposes of a criminal jury
trial, which involves one's civil or political rights, the majority said no.
For purposes of public transportation, where the facilities were equal,
the majority said yes. In justification the majority attempted to
reason in two ways: analogically, it pointed to a like color classifica-
tion, with equal facilities required, for public education;10 3 separately,
and on the basis of its allegedly independent thoughts and views, it
felt that "[i]n determining the question of [the classification's] rea-
sonableness it [the legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to
the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with
a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the
public peace and good order."104 These two methods of reasoning are,
however, intertwined and somewhat circular. The "established" mores
require illustration, and the only illustration given involved public
carriers (denounced under commerce distinctions, but used to show
the national feeling), intermarriage (decided prior to 1868 on contract
impairment grounds, but also demonstrative of national feeling),
theatres (not covered by the new amendment where solely private
conduct is involved, but also showing national feeling), 05 and educa-
tion. The illustrations disclosed that in some instances the classification
was denounced, and in others upheld; thus, color apparently was
not an "established" basis. The majority distinguished between the
Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLum. L. REV. 609 (1923). See also
BERGEn, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY (1963); DunmEnm, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
METHOD (1938); H. GEaRT & C. MI.Ls, CHArAcE AND SocrL STRucTURE (1953);
SEELEY, THE Am=cAIMAToN OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1967); and note 136 infra.
Even if these statements and views are rejected, the overall approach is still valid, since
the Plessy bench did go into this background, and the Brown bench could do likewise.
102. Of course a "pure" equal protection violation may occur, e.g., Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). But this was because the Court struck down the
invalid color classification which automatically threw all whites and blacks into one
class (for jury service), so that all in the class had to be treated equally; this equal
treatment not being granted on the facts in that case, the statute and its application
were thereupon rejected.
103. 163 U.S. at 544-45.
104. 163 U.S. at 550.
105. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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civil and political rights of the blacks, and their social rights. Cases
rejecting color as the basis for a classification involved the former,
whereas the latter could not be touched by legislation or decision.
Therefore, since educational classification did not involve any civil
or political rights, the classification impliedly fell onto the social base;
and, since all of the decisions and the national background showed
"usages, customs, and traditions" supporting this classification, then,
"[g]auged by this standard"05 color could be so used.
Granting all the majority says, there still remains the problem of
change. Do "established usages" remain forever established? Where
are they found? If change is permitted, then how is it to be accom-
plished? When and how will it be recognized? For example, Con-
gress may lay and collect taxes, but a constitutional limitation pre-
vented any direct tax'0 7 until the sixteenth amendment removed it;
and so, too, may other constitutional amendments change the docu-
ment. But nowhere in any portion of the Constitution or amendents
does "established usages" appear. Plessy couples this phrase with
the reasonableness of the legislative classification; the phrase must
therefore be either a statutory or a judicial creation. If the former then
it must be found so expressed or implied, with change occurring by
virtue of statute, or by judicial interpretation of a statute. If created
judicially (or in combination with a legislative change), then what
the judiciary has created, it may itself change, and its reasons may
be many or few, legal or personal." 8 In Plessy the "established usages"
were not in the statute but were adopted by the Court on its own
in order to determine and uphold the reasonableness of the classifica-
106. 163 U.S. at 550.
107. Art. 1, § 8, ci. 1, & § 9, cl. 4, although a direct tax could have been laid if "in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration" as required under § 2, cl. 3.
108. Although Mr. Justice Holmes inveighed against the Constitution's use of Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1903), he
felt that there was no "limit but the sky" to the court's power to invalidate laws, even
though the Justices should not "embody . . .economic or moral beliefs" in their actions.
See his dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930). Mr. Justice Stone
also decried the use by the Justices of their "own personal economic predilections" in
deciding cases. Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936) (dissenting). The
Brandeis Brief, presented in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1908), brought
before the Court what it said were not technically speaking legal authorities; thus, the
Court, continued the Brandeis Brief, stated that "when a question of fact is debated and
debatable and the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected
by the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long-continued belief con-
cerning it is worthy of consideration . . ." 208 U.S. at 421. The fact is that no bench
or individual Justice ever deals in any restricted or purely legal manner with the facts
before them, that their training and biases do form a background for their decisions,
and they do legislate, even if only interstitially. Regardless of their designation as
liberal, conservative, activist or passivist, all Justices may be so "accused." This state-
ment of position should prevent misunderstanding concerning exactly what this writer
is urging.
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tion, although Mr. Justice Harlan bitterly dissented to the Court's
reasoning. His contention was that all these established usages pre-
dated the Civil War amendments; that these amendments "removed
the race line from our governmental systems;" and that "the most
important" state decisions before 1868 "are wholly inapplicable,
because rendered prior to the adoption of the last amendments to
the Constitution, when colored people had very few rights which
the dominant race felt obliged to respect." He thought that "[o]thers
were made at a time when public opinion, in many localities, was
dominated by the institution of slavery; . . . and when . . . race
prejudice was, practically, the supreme law of the land." Mr. Justice
Harlan believed that "[t]hose decisions cannot be guides in the
new era since 1868;" that therefore "Our Constitution [at least in
1896] is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens;" and that state enactments, regulating the enjoyment of
civil rights,10 9 upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat
legitimate results of the war, under the pretense of recognizing equal-
ity of rights, can have no other result than to render permanent peace
impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the continuance of
which must do harm to all concerned. This question is not met by
the suggestion that social equality cannot exist between the white
and black races in this country. "The arbitrary separation here . . .
on the basis of race . . . is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent
with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established
by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds."110
The locking of judicial horns is therefore not upon the prior exis-
tence of any "usages, customs, and traditions," nor is it upon whether
these are subject to change, nor on whether the Supreme Court,
without legislative expression, can and should determine if a change
has occurred, nor on whether there factually have occurred significant
developments in the 1861-1868 period, nor on whether these develop-
ments have affected the national existence. Rather, the judicial conflict
is whether these prior "usages" have continued unscathed into 1896.
The answer of the majority to this last is yes, whereas that of Mr.
Justice Harlan is no, and both are entitled to their opinions personally
and judicially.
If this overall analysis has been properly developed then a few
109. Mr. Justice Harlan thus impliedly disagrees with the majority in its dichotomy
of rights wherein the assignment is based upon race. He also feels that "in respect of
civil rights common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does not, I
think, permit any people authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected
in the enjoyment of such rights." 163 U.S. at 554. See also 163 U.S. at 554-55. Mr.
Justice Harlan nowhere expresses direct disagreement on the civil rights-social aspect
of the majority opinion.
110. 163 U.S. 555.
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significant conclusions may be ventured. First, that Plessy discloses
the judiciary actively determining the constitutionality and legality
of a statutory classification upon a standard created, interpreted, and
applied by itself, retaining the corresponding ability to change or
modify this standard, but refusing to do so because no sufficient
reasons appear. Second, that if between 1861 and 1896 this standard
was not changed by the facts of national life, this does not necessarily
mean that between 1896 and 1954 such a change might not have
occurred. Third, whether or not change in this second period did
occur, a re-examination is, in the absence of legislative expressions,"'
within the power and province of the judiciary." 2  Finally, that
periodic judicial re-examination of such a standard is thus permited,
required, and sanctioned. In effect this permitted and required the
Supreme Court, in 1954, to conduct its own examination in the light of
current usages, customs, and traditions, to determine afresh whether
111. If a legislative expression is present the judiciary still has ultimate power to
determine xeasonableness; if unreasonable, then the basic question is whether an area
of purely legislative political power is involved. If not, then the judiciary has concurrent
power to enter, although it may defer to the legislature. In effect this approach super-
ficially rejects statements such as those of Mr. Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), that "[w]e do not sit as a superlegislature to determine
the wisdom, need, and propriety of [state] laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions." 381 U.S. at 482. If "ordinarily" were inserted between
"not" and "sit," and "purely" inserted between "touch" and "economic," this would
be more accurate; for, where the economic, business, or social aspect detrimentally
affects one's constitutional rights, the state legislature must bow to the Court's judgment.
Citations for this begin with the first overturning of any state legislative enactment,
and continue into the quoted case above. Insofar as the federal legislature is con-
cerned, different policies may enter, but, it is suggested, the approach is the same
although in practice the effect or consequences may result in differences.
112. Even if the legislature did so amend the statute, the question of the con-
stitutionality of the amended statute, in the light of the admitted change, would still
remain, i.e., has the statute kept pace with the change? See Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), upholding the state's mortgage moratorium act,
one reason being that "[tjhe legislation is temporary in operation. It is limited to
the exigency which called it forth. While the postponement of the period of redemp-
tion from the foreclosure sale is to May 1, 1935, that period may be reduced by the
order of the court under the statute, in case of a change in circumstances, and the
operation of the statute itself could not validly outlast the emergency or be so
extended [by the legislature] as virtually to destroy the contracts." 290 U.S. at 447.
If circumstances required and the legislature refused to reduce the period of redemp-
tion, then the judiciary would declare the statute unconstitutional. See, e.g., East N.Y.
Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945), sustaining a renewal of analogous provisions.
In that case the Court said that "[jiustification for the 1943 [later] enactment is not
negatived because the factors that induced and constitutionally supported its enactment
were different from those which induced and supported the moratorium statute of
1933." Mr. Justice Frankfurter also wrote: "The whole course of the New York
moratorium legislation shows the empiric process of legislation at its fairest; frequent
reconsideration, intensive study of the consequences of what has been done, readjust-
ment to changing conditions, and safeguarding the future on the basis of responsible
forecasts." 326 U.S. at 234-35. This last quotation indicates, of course, a situation
where the judiciary approves a legislative change which in the Home Building quotation
is mentioned as necessary when conditions become different.
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a color basis for classification in public education was to be upheld.
Two questions need first be answered: Should a re-examination be
conducted of such an "established" standard, since the nation has
lived under it for so long and thereby continued color discrimination?
If re-examination should occur, what factors are to be taken into
account by the judiciary?
As originally noted, the major objection by Hyneman to the Brown
decision is the enormity of the social, not political, property or legal,
consequences," 3 and that such a judicial determination plus its con-
sequences is without precedent." 4 On the other hand, the admonitory
language of the 1896 dissent, discloses a fear of enormous social
consequences of a decision which permits forced segregation: "What
can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create
and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which in fact proceed on the ground that colored citizens
are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in
public coaches occupied by white citizens?""5  Perhaps the rejoinder
to Hyneman and others is that they are correct in their desire to
mitigate the consequences of the judiciary's incursion into this area,
but merely sixty years too late; and the repercussions of Plessy were
felt in the armed forces in World War II, with its corresponding
impact upon the national struggle." 6 There may be the further reply
that before 1954 there had been rejections of such color classifica-
tions, 17 and also differentiations or exceptions, for example where the
113. See notes 19-20 supra.
114. The "I told you so" prophets also point to the wave of demonstrations, riots
and Black Power activities to cluck their tongues at the temerity of the 1954 bench
in venturing into this "established" field.
115. 163 U.S. at 560. See Forkosch, supra note 6 at 108: "On December 1, 1955,
Mrs. Rosa Parks, a Negro seamstress, said she had such a right [to ride in the front
of a bus] and refused to move to the rear in a Montgomery bus; the Freedom Move-
ment began from this small incident .. "
116. Beginning with the Executive Orders, note 117 infra, the nation has recog-
nized the necessity for removing race lines where it is engaged in a struggle for its
existence. Today's admitted "total involvement" of the entire civilian population in the
event of a large-scale war underlines the significance and necessity of this removal.
117. E.g., the state anti-discrimination laws. See Sutin, The Experience of State
Fair Employment Commissions: A Comparative Study, 18 VAsN. L. REv. 985 (1965);
M. SOvERN, LEGAL RESTRAwTs ON RAcrAL DIsCMrUh4 ATION IN EMPLOYMENT 253
(1966). Somewhat more to the "national" point, the Ramspeck Act of 1940, 5
U.S.C. § 631a (1964), prevented discrimination in federal employment on account of
race, color, or creed. See also Roosevelt's Exec. Order No. 8587, 5 Fed. Reg. 4445
(1940); Truman's Exec. Order No. 9691, 11 Fed. Reg. 1331, 1382 (1946), and No.
9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1948). For the armed forces see Truman's Exec. Order No.
9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948). ByEns, A STUDY OF THE NEGRO In M Arrany
SERvIcE (1947), gives a background to the eventual federal Civil Rights legislation.
See also REPORT OF PREsWDENT's CoMM. ON CrvIL RiG Ts, To SECURE THESE BIGHTs
20-30 (1947); Note, Racial Violence and Civil Rights Law Enforcement, 18 U. Cm.
L. REv. 769 (1951); G. MYRDAL, AN AMmuCAN DLEMmA ch. 27 (1944).
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racial group was denied the right to acquire and use property;118 or
made subject to restrictive covenants in the purchase of homes;"' or
120
even where a physically equal law school was offered, a law student
was held to be deprived of the "rich traditions and prestige" which
the white school enjoyed.121 If ever a background disclosed movement
and changes in the national sphere, if not in a quantitatively small
but relatively significant group of Southern states, going even beyond
Mr. Justice Harlan's description in his Plessy dissent, and if ever
decisions portended a judicial recognition of such changes, they were
here to be found.' 22 In the field of educational policy, an informed
professional group articulated its feeling in urging that "as the
principle of free public education was the first important step in
realizing democratic objectives through our educational system, so
completely non-segregated public education is an essential element in
reaching that goal."1' 3 Or, phrased differently, while the personal
right 124 of an individual under the equal protection clause to a non-
segregated education may be somewhat infinitesimal in the overall
picture, still, when added to those of others, the total becomes so
large that an impact upon national policy, goals, and efforts necessarily
follows. Furthermore, where the nation's political and social goals,
and democratic methods and ends are so vitally affected and hindered
by a denial of these rights, then prior dams or hinderances which
118. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
119. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The companion case of Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24 (1948), held unenforceable a District of Columbia restrictive covenant
under what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). State cases were also decided, some on
different grounds. See, e.g., Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166, 44 S.W.2d 857 (1931);
Yoshida v. Celbert Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D. & C. 321 (1946). In Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the Court refused to permit damages for breach of a racial
restriction. Accord, Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952). Clifton
v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
120. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950), although
these location disadvantages can be said to be within the "tangible" area.
121. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950).
122. See Ransmeier, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Separate but Equal"
Doctrine, 50 Micr. L. REv. 203, 238-40 (1951); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
123. Brief for the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Educa-
tion, as Amicus Curiae in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), reprinted in 34
iMINm. L. REv. 289, 319 (1950).
124. "The rights established are personal rights." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948). See also McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), where
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes dismissed a suit brought by five persons against five railroads
to restrain the railroads from complying with an Oklahoma statute of 1910 which
required the roads to provide separate but equal facilities. One reason given for the
dismissal was that the plaintiffs could not raise the claim that other Negroes in the
state might be or had been injured since their rights were personal and the plaintiffs
themselves had to be injured before a restraining order could be issued.
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created or continued them should or must be limited or removed. 12 5
Assuming re-examination of Plessy was required in 1954, what
factors had to be considered? Under the separate-but-equal formula
a court would consider only the tangible factors in each case and make
a comparison of them; if this were to be still determinative in Brown
then intangibles, even if present, would not be considered where
tangible inequality was found, and this because the Court seeks to
avoid raising new constitutional issues whenever possible.'2 Under
this view, the Court in Brown had first to acknowledge that there was
substantial equality as to all such tangible factors. 127 What intangibles
could and would now enter to influence the decision? Assuming the
intangibles in Plessy were the institutional facts of "established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people," then it would be these which
had to be considered, because, if modified or changed in any ap-
preciable manner, and especially if discarded by 1954, the doctrine
and the formula might no longer be judicially valid.
Plessy accepted the institutional fact of customs and usages as then
given and unchanged, but in effect it denied that the judiciary must
reject customs and usages as a standard against which to examine the
legislative classification; Brown could have questioned the continued
existence of this institutional fact, to see if it was now still unchanged,
and then determine whether to accept or reject it as a standard.
However, Brown did not expressly do this. Impliedly these institu-
tional facts were examined and discarded, but Chief Justice Warren's
language was couched in pragmatic terms, namely, since tangibles
were not involved, "we must look instead to the effect of segregation
itself on public education," and "must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American
125. Although pre-1954 decisions and opinions are being used, the 1966 language of
Mr. Justice Douglas in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), is
appropos: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race ...are
traditionally disfavored.... the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality .... Notions of what
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change ....
Seven of the eight Justices then sitting [in Plessy joined] ... in expressions of what
constituted unequal and discriminatory treatment that sound strange to a contemporary
ear. When, in 1954 ...we repudiated [Plessy] .. .. we stated: 'In approaching
this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written."' 383 U.S. at 668,
669-70. Justices Black and Harlan (Stewart joining) wrote dissenting opinions.
126. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Brandeis' famous concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936).
127. 347 U.S. at 492 n.9. Chief Justice Warren later added: "We come then to the
question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis
of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal,




life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined
if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the
equal protection of the laws."m It is unnecessary to cite abundant
authority to support this practical and necessary approach. Holmes'
famous expression that "The life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience," 2 9 is merely one of the dozens of similar views
found in books' 30 and legal opinions,' 31 and yet it is not sufficient. A
recognition of experience must also take into account those who
simultaneously experience and react 132 "lest we erect our prejudices
into fixed legal principles." 133 Further, as one jurisprudent writes,
"The perpetual process of interpretation must inevitably produce an
equally active metabolism in the subject matter of usage. Customs
become modified, sometimes to such an extent that they cease to
exist. But always the jurist or magistrate has to deal with practices
derived in the first instance from actual social relationships."'
134
Chief Justice Warren, therefore, first looked at the effects of the
segregation on the child and education, and the place of education
in the nation, in order to determine the equal protection question.
He quoted the findings of the lower courts in the Kansas and Dela-
ware cases that segregation created a sense of inferiority among the
children in the minority, had a detrimental and retarding effect upon
them especially in their learning motivations and results, and con-
128. 347 U.S. at 492-93.
129. 0. HOLmES, TnE ComtmoN LAW 1 (1881).
130. E.g., selections by M. Cotton & F. CoHEN, READiNGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHmLOSOPHY ch. 8 (1951); L. STOE-, THE PROVWNCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW pt.
I (1950).
131. E.g., Mr. Justice Sutherland: "Experience is of all teachers the most de-
pendable, and . . . is a continuous process .... ." Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371, 381 (1933); Mr. Justice Cardozo: "In the revealing light of experience the
hazards to be avoided are disclosed to us as the hazards that ensued." Do Haen v.
Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350, 355, 179 N.E. 764 (1932); Mr. Justice
McKenna; "[O]ur surest recourse is in what has been done," Merrick v. N. W. Halsey
& Co., 242 U.S. 568, 587 (1917); Mr. Justice Stone, "Only time and costly experience
can give the answers," United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533, 582 (1944).
132. See B. CARUozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcAL. PRocEss 167 (1921): "Deep
below consciousness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which
make the man, whether he be litigant or judge." See also HoLMES, supra note 129,
at 1: "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining" cases.
133. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932), or, as Tennyson wrote, "Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."
MoRTE D'Awrmm.
134. C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 128 (1964).
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cluded that "Separate educational facilities are inherently 35 un-
equal."'136 This conclusion was predicated upon the equality of the
tangibles, and thus had to mean that, even so, the separation or
classification could not stand because it was "inherently unequal."
This, alone, should therefore have been sufficient to invalidate it, but
in view of the historic background Chief Justice Warren now pointed
up the position occupied by education in the nation's existence:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.137
Whether this or any examination of Brown discloses or can disclose
the ability of the Supreme Court to reject Plessy's language depends
greatly upon the overall approach with which one views the judicial
process. There may be solid disagreement with the conclusions of
a court, or with its choice of materials and its use of reasoning or
logic, but this ordinarily does not reject the court's jurisdiction or
power generally to decide. Because of their peculiar and exceedingly
great impact upon people, the nation, and even throughout the world,
the Supreme Court's opinions can no longer, if ever they were, be cast
against a parochial view of the decision-making process. "The true
grounds of decisions are considerations of policy and of social advan-
135. The use of this term involves not only a question of policy, see, e.g., note 138
infra, but also a question of approach. See Mr. Justice White's statement in McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964), that "Such [race] classifications bear a far
heavier burden of justification." To the extent that a new preferred position is being
given to racial classification insofar as a justification thereof carries a burden heavier
than others, can an analogy be drawn to the first amendment? See M. FoRxoscH,
CONsTrrurIoNAL LAw 393-99 (1963).
136. 347 U.S. at 495. These findings of fact had to be supported not only by
the evidentiary facts but also as permissible inferences therefrom. See M. FoaxoscH, A
TATISEA oN ADumIsThRA=w LAw ch. XIV (1956). Thus, said Chief Justice Warren,
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem authority. Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." 347 U.S. at 494-95.
The modem sociological and educational authorities cited by him gave rise to the
charges already mentioned at the outset of this paper.
137. 347 U.S. at 493. There were no citations or references given, and these
conclusory views are therefore subject to attack. What, then, of the Plessy conclusions
and views already discussed?
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tage... which rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely,
if ever, are capable of unanswerable proof."13 The end of law is to
serve man139 and neither can strait jacket the other.
138. Holmes, dissenting in Vegelaln v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077,
1080 (1896). See also HoLMs, supra note 129 at 6, 8, 35, 108; 0. HOLmES, COL-
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 184 (1920); cf. the analysis of policy as a determinant in the
application of the Just Cause Doctrine in M. FomxoscH, A TnrAnsE ON LABOR LAW
ch. X (2d ed. 1965).
139. See, e.g., Forkosch, What is Legal History, in EssAys 1N LEGAL His-roay i
HONOR or FE=aax FRma -au 2, 5 (Forkosch ed. 1966).
